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Original Article
A Hospital-wide Outbreak of Serratia marcescens,
and Ishikawa’s “Fishbone” Analysis to Support
Outbreak Control
Luzia Vetter, RN; Guido Schuepfer, MD, PhD, MBA HSG; Stefan P. Kuster, MD, MSc; Marco Rossi, MD
A nosocomial outbreak of Serratia marcescens in respiratory samples predominantly from patients in a surgical inten-
sive care unit is reported. Most of these patients were cardiac surgical patients. Initially, a vigorous but inconclusive
investigation was implemented on the basis of standardized (according the US Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention) steps of outbreak investigation. Then, a systemic quality management approach with “fishbone” analysis
was added. As a consequence, plausible causes for the outbreak were identified: (i) S marcescens was found on the
transesophageal echocardiography probe used during cardiac surgery; and (ii) the quality of the surface disinfection
was insufficient due to multiple reasons and was completely reengineered. In conclusion, in addition to the stan-
dardized steps of outbreak investigation, the complementary use of quality management tools such as the Ishikawa
“fishbone” analysis is helpful for outbreak control. The complete reengineering of the disinfectant procurement and
logistics is assumed to have been the most effective measure to control the described outbreak.
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S erratia marcescens is a gram-negative bacteriumbelonging to the Enterobacteriaceae family. It is
well recognized as a causative agent of severe nosoco-
mial infections, including pneumonia, meningitis, bac-
teremia, urinary tract infections, endocarditis, conjunc-
tivitis, and surgical site infections. In hospitals, Serratia
species survive and grow in moist environments and
sites and not uncommonly colonize human bowel, blad-
der, upper respiratory tract, and skin.
Different environmental sources for S marcescens
infection outbreaks have been described, including con-
taminated medical devices,1 intravenous and topical
solutions,2 liquid soap,3 and air-conditioning.4
In this report, the investigation and control pro-
cess concerning an outbreak of S marcescens lasting
12 months in an acute care hospital with 600 beds are
presented and discussed.
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METHODS
Setting
The outbreak occurred in the Luzerner Kantonsspital,
which is a 600-bed public acute care teaching hospi-
tal serving a population of about 0.5 million people in
central Switzerland. The surgical department includes
all surgical subspecialties, although with no transplant
unit. Approximately 35 000 surgical procedures are per-
formed annually. Surgical intensive care patients are
cared for in a specialized 12-bed intensive care unit
(ICU).
Outbreak investigation
The “ten steps of an outbreak investigation” were fol-
lowed, as presented by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC)5:
1. Prepare for field work
2. Establish the existence of an outbreak
3. Verify the diagnosis
4. Define an identify cases
5. Describe and orient the data in terms of time,
place, and person
6. Develop hypotheses
7. Evaluate hypotheses
8. Refine hypothesis and carry out of additional
studies
9. Implement control and prevention measures
10. Communicate findings
Ishikawa fishbone approach
The fishbone diagram6,7 was used as a visual tool to
better portray contributing factors as follows: people,
process, equipment, material, and management.
Microbiologic methods
During the outbreak, patient screening included throat
swabbing or sampling tracheal secretions when
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patients were intubated. The samples were inoculated
on MacConkey agar and incubated at 37◦C for 24 to
48 hours. Identification of bacterial strains was made
with MALDI/TOF (matrix-assisted laser desorption-
ionization/time-of-flight) mass spectrometry.
All isolates with S marcescens were genotyped
and compared using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis
(PFGE) using XbaI restriction enzyme. The patterns
were compared using the GelCompar software. Inter-
pretation was done as described elsewhere.8
Case-controlled comparison
Patients (N = 27) with S marcescens strain 1 in PFGE
were matched with 2 controls and them compared
with their control cases. Controls were matched for
age (±5 years), time of hospital stay (±2 weeks), and
ward. Patients with a sample of S marcescens with the
same PFGE pattern (see Figure 3) but heterogeneous
epidemiologic background were included.
All statistical analyses were performed using Inter-
cooled Stata Software version 11 for Windows (Stata
Corp, College Station, Texas). We used univariate con-
ditional logistic regression analysis for the calculation
of risk factors. The low number of cases precluded any
multivariable analyses. A 2-tailed test of significance
with a P value of less than .05 was considered statisti-
cally significant.
RESULTS
Outbreak investigation
In July 2012, 3 cardiac surgical ICU patients had res-
piratory colonization or infection with S marcescens.
Because of the accumulation of diagnosed cases, this
cluster was defined as an outbreak by the hospital’s
infectious disease department, and the standardized
CDC steps of outbreak investigation were initiated.5
Prepare for field work
The ICU attending physician informed the infection con-
trol team about 3 patients with S marcescens in respi-
ratory samples in the cardiac surgical unit in 1 week.
Establish the existence of an outbreak
Three patients colonized or infected with S marcescens
at the same time in the same ward is absolutely unex-
pected, so an outbreak situation was assumed.
Verify the diagnosis
Diagnosis was verified by culture-proven colonization
or infection with S marcescens.
Define and identify cases
The case definition was as follows: S marcescens in
a respiratory sample during hospitalization on the ICU.
Throughout the next 4 weeks, all cardiac surgical pa-
tients were screened for S marcescens by a pharyngeal
swab postoperatively. In addition, the infection control
team collected clinical and epidemiologic information,
studied risk factors, and documented all findings in a
database.
Describe and orient the data in terms of time, place,
and person
The outbreak was visualized by 2 epidemic curves over
time: the first with the case definition “Sample with
S marcescens in a respiratory probe” (see Figure 5),
and the second with all samples of S marcescens (see
Figure 6).
The sequential screening identified the operating
room (OR) as the location of S marcescens acquisition
because the first probes while entering the ward and
the second by entering the OR were always negative
(no proof of S marcescens). Two patients had positive
samples when entering the ICU after surgery. There-
fore, the identification of a point source in the OR was
forced by observing the process of anesthesia induc-
tion and monitoring and swabbing the transesophageal
echocardiography (TOE) probe before and after use. At
that point, 44 patients had S marcescens in a respira-
tory sample. All S marcescens strains from patients in
our hospital were sent to an external reference labora-
tory for molecular typing by PFGE.
The molecular typing by PFGE showed 2 dominant
clusters of S marcescens with a same PFGE pat-
tern. The first cluster with S marcescens was difficult
to interpret. Epidemiologically, these cases were too
heterogeneous (Figure 3). Notably, the same type of
S marcescens strain was also found at least in another
tertiary care hospital in Switzerland.
The second cluster of 17 S marcescens isolates with
the same pattern included patients who underwent car-
diac surgery with the TOE probe left in place during
surgery. The same strain was also found on the TOE
probe when screened by several moistened swabs.
The probe was replaced. The original TOE probe sur-
face was then assessed using a microscope, and the
flexible part of this probe showed a brittle and cracked
surface on light microscopy (Figures 1 and 2).
Using some of the patients from the first cluster
of S marcescens infection, we started a case-control
study. No source for the acquisition with S marcescens
strain 1 in the PFGE (Figure 3) could be detected with
Figure 1. The surface of a used transesophageal echocar-
diography probe under the microscope during an outbreak:
The surface is scratched and broken.
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Figure 2. The surface of a new transesophageal echocar-
diography probe under the microscope.
the case-control study. The study showed 2 risk factors
for the acquisition of S marcescens: reoperation 4/17
cases (19%) versus 0/34 (0%) (P < .001) and hospital-
ization in the ICU before the detection of S marcescens
(17% controls versus 56% cases (P = .002). Hos-
pitalization in the recovery room before detection of
S marcescens was shown to be protective: 65% (con-
trols) versus 26% (cases) (P = .002).
Develop hypotheses
The interpretation of the collected data was suggestive
of a point source of outbreak. Therefore, further steps
were initiated and samples taken for analysis: tap water
in the ICU was sampled for S marcescens and Pseu-
domonas aeruginosa, the environment (soaps, disin-
fection wipes, creams, ultrasonic gel, and TOE probe)
was also sampled using swabs moistened with sterile
saline water, and cleaning and disinfection in the ICU
were intensified in frequency.
The infection control team audited the care process
in the ICU. Patient care was observed closely in the
search for hygiene lapses. Moreover, the importance of
the hand hygiene was emphasized and hand hygiene
compliance was monitored at the bedside.
Evaluate hypotheses
None of the analyses of samples from the sources
mentioned earlier revealed S marcescens. In tap water,
different bacteria, including Stenotrophomonas mal-
tophilia, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and Bacillus sp,
were found, but these were determined to be inci-
dental and not the source of the outbreak. Despite all
measures, the number of patients with S marcescens
in a respiratory probe was still increasing, and a point
source was still assumed, although not clearly identi-
fied. To control the ongoing outbreak, CDC’s step 5 was
reconsidered, but data collection was modified:
People who underwent cardiac surgery were se-
quentially screened by a pharyngeal swab at 4
times: entering the hospital, entering the OR, while
leaving the OR and entering the ICU, and leaving
the ICU.
The method for sampling disinfection wipes was
changed according to a recent publication.9 This
study showed a lower yield of sampling by swabs
than by culturing the disinfection solution.
The screening of probes from the TOE probe was
also changed: instead of only 1, several moistened
swabs at different locations of the TOE probe were
used.
Inhalation therapy was assumed to be a risk fac-
tor for the acquisition of S marcescens, but no
source was identified and that specific hypothesis
was abandoned.
Infection control measures
The processes of cleaning and disinfection of TOE
probes were reassessed and optimized. It is very dif-
ficult to clean and disinfect such an instrument be-
cause there is no automated purpose-built processor
as there is, for example, for endoscopes. As a first
step in a setup procedure after use, mechanical clean-
ing is mandatory to remove any biofilm that could inter-
fere with probe disinfection. After this step, the whole
probe in a length of (about) 1.5 m must be rinsed with
sterile water to remove the disinfectant. Also, the stor-
age of the probes was improved: the probe now hangs
in a box avoiding humidity and avoiding any unneces-
sary contacts. Finally, the use of a single-use sheet
(condom) was strongly recommended to clinicians.
During our investigation, an unexpected reason for
the first cluster of S marcescens identified in this out-
break was found. The results from the samples of the
disinfection wipes were evaluated, and the solution in
the disinfection boxes was tested. Several wipe boxes
refilled with aldehyde disinfectant were contaminated
by Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Pseudomonas putida,
and Bacillus cereus. In the alcohol-based disinfection
wipe boxes, there was no growth of germs. As a con-
sequence, the use of wipe dispensers with aldehyde
disinfectant was no longer allowed and alcohol-based
wipe dispensers were used instead.
Refine hypotheses and carry out additional studies
The contaminated disinfection solution forced a check
of the quality of surface disinfection in the entire hospi-
tal. In the OR and ICUs, proportioning dispensers were
used for preparing the disinfectant. But the solution in
the bottles had different color gradations, suggesting
different disinfectant concentrations. The concentra-
tion of aldehyde in several samples was measured. The
range of measured concentrations did not reach the tar-
get value of 0.5% and had a wide variation. Some of
the dispensers for preparing this disinfectant were not
authorized for hospital use.10 Some of the proportioning
dispensers had trouble with the disinfectant containers
that the Luzerner Kantonsspital used: the seals became
brittle very often and had to be replaced, although a
compatible disinfection concentrate was used.
Usage of all of these dispensers was suspended, and
the teams were instructed how to prepare the disinfec-
tant solutions manually and to install single-use bottles
for use on-site.
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Figure 3. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis pattern of patients with Serratia marcescens infection: strain 1 is the dominant
cluster, but patients have heterogeneous epidemiologic background. Strain 2 samples are all from patients who underwent
cardiac surgery with the transesophageal echocardiography probe left in place.
In addition, the infection control team scrutinized the
disinfection process outside the OR and ICUs in our
hospital. A canister of 8-L content was used to pre-
pare the use solution of disinfectant from the con-
centrate. From this bottle, the solution was poured
into smaller bottles that were used in patient rooms
or for direct use from this canister. This canister
was never reprocessed because there was no conve-
nient possibility of reprocessing. The smaller bottles
used in the patient rooms were also not reprocessed
routinely.9
In addition, canisters for preparing the disinfectant
solution were emptied and dried after filling the smaller
bottles for the patient rooms. These bottles were re-
placed by disposable single-use bottles.
A spot-check of concentration from this disinfec-
tion solution showed varying and insufficient concen-
trations. Diluting the disinfectant on the ward was no
longer allowed and replaced by central production with
a proportioning automat. A trained person produces the
disinfectant in single-use bottles for the whole hospi-
tal except the facility management. Finally, the ready-
to-use disinfectant solution was replaced by com-
mercially diluted disinfectant packed in ready-to-use
bottles.
The new information about this low-quality disin-
fectant helped view the outbreak of S marcescens
in a new light. The infection control team is con-
vinced that contaminated and low concentrated
disinfectant solutions contributed to the observed
Copyright © 2016 Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
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outbreak. A higher colonization pressure together with
other not identified problems may then have promoted
the outbreak. Accordingly, the so-called “fishbone
diagram” by Ishikawa was used to evaluate and im-
prove our process.6 Usually, not one but several fac-
tors (eg, human, environmental, management, equip-
ment) contribute to a problem (Figure 4). A recom-
mended approach is to check and improve all the
“fishbone” items at the same time without knowing
the exact contribution of each factor to the problem
under investigation.
After the implementation of the central disinfectant
preparing station, the outbreak of S marcescens in
a respiratory system of cardiac surgical ICU patients
came under control. All the new cases found by the suc-
cessive screening measures were colonized by strain
1, whereas strain 2 (associated with the TOE probe)
was no longer detectable (Figures 5 and 6).
Figure 4. (A) Ishikawa fishbone approach model. (B) Ishikawa fishbone approach diagram applied in Serratia outbreak. TOE
indicates transesophageal echocardiography.
Figure 5. Epicurve with the case definition “sample with Serratia marcescens” in a respiratory probe.
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6 January–March 2016  Volume 25  Number 1 www.qmhcjournal.com
Figure 6. Epicurve with all samples of Serratia marcescens.
Implement control and prevention measures
There were several different prevention measures that
we needed to implement because this outbreak had
several causes as exemplified by the fishbone model.
Ultimately, the disinfection process was optimized by
using a commercialized diluted disinfectant. In addition,
the preparation of TOE probes was optimized and
periodic probe sampling was then conducted by the
infection control team. Also, the whole-hospital hand
hygiene compliance was measured and retrained on
a periodic base. To confirm the stoppage of this out-
break, the monitoring process as described earlier to
find S marcescens was sustained.
DISCUSSION
A hospital-wide outbreak with S marcescens involving
91 patients over 12 months is described. The molec-
ular typing showed 2 clusters contributing to this out-
break. One included epidemiologically heterogeneous
patients, and the second one was triggered by the point
source of a contaminated TOE probe.
The initial approach of stepwise outbreak investi-
gation according to the CDC guidelines (Table) was
not successful in our hands for identifying the out-
break risks and eliminating them. Therefore, a systemic
approach known in quality management using “fish-
bone” analysis as described by Ishikawa6 (Figure 4)
was instituted. This universal tool for improving qual-
ity helps identify causes and effects of a problem in
a structured manner. This framework enables amend-
ments of several contributing factors simultaneously.
The fishbone diagram is a visual tool that can fa-
cilitate grasp of multiple factors that contribute to
an outbreak. The preparation of the fishbone dia-
gram can be a format for team brainstorming and
problem solving. It promotes systematic thinking
through visual linkages, and it helps structure discus-
sion and maintains focus on the current issues or
problems.
Using the fishbone diagram properly, the problem un-
der investigation is defined and the search for causes
is structured. The causes are grouped into major cat-
egories to identify the sources of variations. The cate-
gories are always the same and are as follows:
• People: Anyone involved with the process
• Process: Any critical point in the process
• Equipment: Any equipment used in the process
• Material: Any material used
• Management: Data generated from the process
used to evaluate its quality
All possible variables can be inserted into this dia-
gram. The approach does not only help identify causes
but also guide corrective measures as shown in our
outbreak. By visualizing all the possible causal fac-
tors, measures to sample and measures to control
were instituted in a coordinated fashion. In a first step,
moistened swabs for searching S marcescens and
Pseudomonas aeruginosa in disinfectant wipe boxes
were taken. As an improvement, in a second step, the
screening strategy was changed and the bacteria in the
disinfectant solution were searched by membrane fil-
tration of the fluid pressed from the wipes. Using this
method, it was provable that the disinfection solution
was insufficient. As a consequence, the “homemade
Table. The 10 Steps for an Outbreak Investigation
as Presented by the Centers for Disease Control
and Preventiona
1 Prepare for field work
2 Establish the existence of an outbreak
3 Verify the diagnosis
4 Define an identify cases
5 Describe and orient the data in terms of time, place, and person
6 Develop hypotheses
7 Evaluate hypotheses
8 Refine hypothesis and carry out of additional studies
9 Implement control and prevention measures
10 Communicate findings
aAdapted with permission from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.5
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disinfectant solutions” were replaced by a commercial-
ized diluted ready-to-use product.
Sampling the TOE probes was also repeated.
The technique remained unchanged, but more sam-
ples were taken and enabled the identification of
S marcescens. This forced a complete reengineering
of the cleaning process for the TOE probes. Finally,
hand hygiene was also retrained and improved.
Under the pressure of all the instituted measures,
the outbreak ceased. The complete reengineering of
the disinfectant procurement and logistics, by imple-
menting and delivering a ready-to-use commercially
produced conveniently bottled disinfectant solution,
was assumed to be the most effective measure to
control the described outbreak. No further evidence of
S marcescens was found by sustained monitoring pro-
cess in cardiac surgical ICU patients.
As in most of the other reported outbreaks (www.
outbreak-database.com), the reservoir and mode of
transmission also remained unknown for the outbreak
part with strain 1 in the PFGE pattern. Only for the
cluster with strain 2, the TOE probe was identified as a
point source.
Classical outbreak investigation recommendations
focus on identifying the source of an outbreak. In con-
trast, the Ishikawa fishbone analysis considers different
factors with influence on quality. This may help find the
origin of a cluster of infections. But even in the absence
of an identified source, quality can be improved. Chang-
ing simultaneously different factors precludes estimat-
ing the impact of a single measure.
CONCLUSIONS
In a complex hospital environment outbreak, investiga-
tion using a systemic quality management focus, based
on the Ishikawa analysis in addition to the established
stepwise CDC procedures, may be helpful and guide
the search for causes. This approach also helps imple-
ment control measures in a structured way and sup-
ports a team approach.
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